INTRODUCTION
This paper studies a dynamic insurance problem between two risk-averse agents with bilateral asymmetric information and balanced budgets. The two agents, both infinitelylived in a pure exchange economy, face idiosyncratic risks in the endowments they receive. Specifically, at each date, they each draw independently a stochastic, privately observed endowment. The endowment is perishable, and there exist no opportunities for the two agents to borrow and lend with outside parties. The two agents hence are constrained to consume the aggregate endowment they receive at each date. Being risk averse, they would wish to pool their endowments together. But this is impeded by the private information about the endowments they receive. The problem that the two agents face, therefore, is to design a feasible trading mechanism which achieves Pareto efficiency subject to the constraint of incentive compatibility: they must both be given the incentives to truthfully reveal their endowments.
The problem we study here is closely related to the dynamic insurance literature led by Townsend (1982) , Spear and Srivastava (1987) , and Thomas and Worrall (1990) , who model relationships between a principal and a single risk-averse agent; and Green (1987) and Phelan and Townsend (1990) , who examine relationships between a principal and a continuum of risk-averse agents. In these models, as in standard principal-agent models such as Holmstrom (1979) , Allen (1985) , and Radner (1985) , a key feature is that the principal, who typically has access to credit markets, can serve as a residual claimant to permit violation of the budget-balancing constraint. In a recent contribution, Atkeson and Lucas (1992) extend the literature by looking at a closed economy where a period-byperiod aggregate resource constraint is imposed. In Atkeson and Lucas, the total consumption handed out by the principal each period to the population cannot exceed some constant endowment level. the two agents to commit to these strategies. Since endowments are perishable, the two agents are constrained to consume the entire aggregate endowment at each date. Being risk averse, they would wish to pool their endowments together. But this is impeded by a problem of information asymmetry. At each date, the history of realized endowments of each agent is his private information.
Given the information structure, any possible trades in our model are to be based solely upon what has been reported by the two agents. For all t> 1, we denote by gat= (rl', . . . , 4,) agent a's reported history of endowments up to date t, where r4 is agent a's reported endowment at date t. Next, let the overall history of reported endowments up to date t be denoted by gt =(g g2t) = (r1, . . r,)E(e x )t= Ht, where rt = (r, r,), and H' is the set of possible histories up to date t. Let Ho 0. Definition 1. A co-insurance contract a is a sequence of functions {u,}t.=1 where S,: H'-+R. Call cr,(g') the amount of good transferred from agent I to agent 2 at date t, conditional on reported history gt up to date t.
Therefore under contract a, at date t, agent 1 will consume -a(g') + e, and agent 2 (gt) + e2. Note that the above way of defining a contract automatically ensures that the two agents will consume exactly the entire aggregate endowment at each date. Also note that the case where cr,= O independent of date and history corresponds to autarky.
We now turn to define the feasibility of a contract. Let a,(gt-1, (0, O)) be the date t net transfer of endowment from agent I to agent 2 if reported history up to date t -I has been g'-' and date t current reports by the two agents are Oi and Oj respectively. Condition (1) simply requires that, at any date, the contract will not take from any agent more than he claims to have received. Therefore, suppose the two agents both report truthfully about their endowments at each date, as they will under the conditions of incentive compatibility to be given shortly, then both agents will consume a non-negative amount of the consumption good.
We proceed now to tackle the issue of incentive compatibility. Basically, a contract cr is said to be perfectly incentive compatible if, at any date, conditional on any history, the continuation profile of af is such that truthful reporting strategies by both agents concerning all future endowments constitute a Nash equilibrium. By modifying the approach in Green (1987) , and Spear and Srivastava (1987) , this can be formulated in a recursive manner. The idea is to decompose the super-incentive problem that each agent faces at the beginning of each date into a sequence of one-step incentive problems, each associated with a single future date. Some additional notation is needed here. Denote by U(oIg'', (0,, Oj)) the date t expected utility (discounted to date t + 1) that the continuation profile (from date t +1 on) of af will deliver to agent 1, conditional on reported history (g'-1, (0,, Oj)) up to date t and that both will report truthfully from date t + 1 on. 
In constraint (2), given that 0, and Oj are the endowments the two agents receive at date t, and reported history up to date t -1 has been gt-l, on the left-hand side of the inequality, -oc,(gt-', (0i, Oj)) +0i is agent l's current consumption and U(cog', (0i, Oj)) his future utility if he and agent 2 both report truthfully, today and from tomorrow on. On the right-hand side of the inequality, -aot(g'', (Ok, Of)) + 0i is agent l's current consumption and U(olg'', (Ok, Oj)) his future utility, if agent 1 cheats by reporting Ok rather than Oi, given that agent 2 reports honestly O0 and that they both will report truthfully from tomorrow on. Hence by Definition 3, incentive compatibility means that, at any date, given any reported history, if one agent chooses to adopt the truthful reporting strategy from that date on, then the other cannot benefit from any one-period misrepresentation at that date. Note that although feasibility will guarantee that the "truth reporting" current consumptions -cr,(g'-1, (0i, Oj)) + Oi and cr,(g'-1, (i, j)) -Oj are non-negative, it may still be the case that the "deviating"-off the equilibrium path-current consumptions -at(g', (Ok, Oj)) + Oi and ct(g'', (0i, Ol)) + Oj take on negative values. This is why we required for mathematical convenience that the utility function u be defined on the whole real line.
We are now in a position to define constrained efficiency. We say that a feasible and incentive compatible contract a is efficient if it maximizes the ex ante expected utility of agent 1, denoted by U(o), subject to delivering a given ex ante expected utility, denoted V(cr), to agent 2. Formally, Definition 4. A co-insurance contract a is constrained efficient at V if it maximizes U(a) subject to constraints (1), (2), (3), and
To close this section, we note that following the literature, we only look at contracts which implement truthful reporting strategies. We also note that here, as in Green, and Atkeson and Lucas, we do not impose that each agent be entitled an expected utility that is at least as high as the autarkic expected utility at any ex post date. We leave this type of enforcement issue aside to focus on the issues of private information and budget balancing.
EXISTENCE OF THE EFFICIENT CONTRACT
Obviously, the efficient contract defined in Definition 4 does not exist for all values of V. In this section, we solve the problem of existence by establishing that an efficient contract at V exists if and only if V is in some compact set we call (Dv. We also develop notations and a fixed point argument that will prove useful in the later sections. 
Note that the constraints in the above definition are the one-step analogues of constraints (1), (2), and (3) in the previous section. Specifically, (5) is feasibility, and (6) and 
UecI(V)
That is, given that agent 2 receives an expected utility V, U*( V) is the maximum expected utility of agent 1 that can be achieved by a feasible and incentive-compatible contract. Our aim is to show that U* is a fixed point of a mapping that we now seek to define. The following lemma establishes in some loose sense an equivalence relationship between efficient allocation rules and efficient contracts. A formal proof of Lemma 4 is left for the reader. Due to (ii) of Lemma 4 then, to solve for an efficient contract, it is sufficient to solve for an efficient allocation rule which in turn amounts to solving the Bellman equation. For illustrative purposes, we now describe briefly how the contract a that is generated by C* in (ii) of Lemma 4 works. Let VO be the ex ante expected utility of agent 2. Suppose, at date 1, Oi and Oj are reported respectively by the two agents. Then the contract says that U*(Oi, Oj)( VO) amount of the consumption good is to be transferred from agent 1 to agent 2. In the meantime, the contract also determines that, from date 2 on, agent 2 is entitled to an expected utility V, = V*(Oi, Oj)(VO). Now as the two agents move to date 2, suppose Oi and Oj are reported, then a*(Oi,, Oj)(VI) will be transferred from agent 1 to agent 2, and V2 = V*(0i,, Oj)( V1) will be promised to agent 2 as his expected utility from date 3 on. In this way the contract rolls forward date by date. Notice that here the expected utility of agent 2, V, is acting as a state variable to summarize history. At the beginning of each date t, nothing but V,_, matters, for today and for the future.
We now go on to derive a characterization of an efficient allocation rule. The following proposition says that no matter what agent 1 reports, agent 2 should receive a smaller transfer of current endowment from agent 1, and be entitled to a higher expected utility from tomorrow on, if he reports a higher endowment. Similarly, if he reports a lower endowment, then he should receive a larger transfer from agent 1 and be entitled to a lower expected utility from tomorrow on. 
FURTHER CHARACTERIZATIONS OF THE EFFICIENT CONTRACT: THE CASE OF TWO ENDOWMENT VALUES
In this section, we present two propositions to further characterize the efficient contract without solving for it analytically. For tractability, we focus on the case where the endowment takes on only two values, i.e. n = 2 and 0= {0, 02}. First, we show in Proposition 4 that a contract where agent 1 transfers a constant amount of the endowment to agent 2 in every period cannot be efficient. A corollary of Proposition 4 hence is that the autarkic contract is dominated by an efficient contract. A constructive proof of Proposition 4 is in the appendix. The rest of this section is devoted to looking at the long-run behaviour of the two agents' expected utilities. To motivate our result, note that a central proposition in Green (1987) is that the long-run distribution of expected utilities across agents is degenerate: for each individual agent in the population, his expected utility converges to negative infinity with probability one. Green assumes that his agents have an exponential utility function. Thomas and Worrall (1990) in their single-agent model show that for a family of utility functions which are not bounded from below, the agent's expected utility also converges to negative infinity with probability one. Atkeson and Lucas (1992) show that in cases in which the utility function of the agents takes either the logarithmic form, the CRRA form, or the CARA form, the expected utility of any individual agent converges to the minimum level in the set of possible expected utilities with probability one. This type of result, however, does not apply here. First, here by assuming that a feasible contract never takes away from any agent more than he receives, the two agents in our model will never consume a negative amount of endowment. This implies that their expected utilities are essentially bounded from below, although the two agents here may have the same unbounded utility function as the agents in, for example, Green (1987) have. This certainly rules out possibilities for the expected utilities of the two agents to converge to minus infinity. Further, given that in our model we have identical agents and they are constrained to consume the entire aggregate endowment each date, it is also unikely that their expected utilities will converge to the minimum in the expected utility possibilities with probability one. Our aim in the rest of the section is to show that the expected utility of each agent actually converges to every expected utility, including the minimum, in (Dv with probability zero. This will guarantee that the long-run distributions of expected utilities of the two agents are not degenerate.
Let Vo-Dv be any arbitrary ex ante expected utility that the constrained efficient contract would promise to agent 2. Let V,(t ?1) be the random variable representing the expected utility to which agent 2 is entitled at the end of date t. Since for each (0,, 01j)e02, the sequence {u*(0i, Oj)(v,)}I'=1 is bounded and hence contains a convergent sub-sequence. For convenience we assume that this sub-sequence is the sequence itself. We therefore can write: lim a*(0i, 0j)(V,)=C, 
COMPUTING THE EFFICIENT CONTRACT
As our discussion in Section 4 indicates, the complex nature of our Bellman equation makes it difficult to solve analytically for an efficient contract. In order to obtain greater insight into the structure of an efficient contract, in this and the next section, we turn to pursue a computational approach. As a first step, we explore in this section two related algorithms for numerical computation of an efficient contract. Following our analysis in Section 4, the key to solving for an efficient contract is to solve for D, the set of admissible expected utility pairs. Once 1D is obtained, then the set of admissible states, i.e. the set of admissible expected utilities of agent 2, Dv, and the value function of the Bellman equation, U*(V), VcDv, are readily computed. Finally, solving the Bellman equation given (Dv and U*( V) will yield the efficient trading scheme {u*(Oi, Oj)( V)} and the optimal law of motion of the state variable { V*(Oi, Oj)( V)}.
The following lemma, which is in the spirit of Abreu-Pearce-Stacchetti (1990), provides an algorithm for solving for D. Basically, starting with a set WoC-V R2 which is large enough, and operating on it iteratively using the operator B, we will then obtain a monotone sequence of sets converging to D. -a)(p-1)/(N-1),p=1,2 Since now we are dealing with a finite space of possible expected utilities, convergence of the sequence { W,} will occur after a finite number of iterations. A deficiency of the above algorithm however is that the amount of computation that it requires to reach the solution can be large. At any (t + 1)th iteration, given the complex nature of incentive compatibility, and that the space W, over which we search for admissible expected utilities is two-dimensional, a large number of nonlinear programming problems must be solved. To reduce computation, we now proceed to develop an alternative algorithm by modifying the one in Lemma 5. The idea here is to compute the value function of the Bellman equation directly, without having to keep track of the whole set of admissible expected utilities 0, as we do in Lemma 5.
Instead of covering the whole space on which the pair of expected utilities (U, V) takes on values with a grid, we now assume that only V is restricted to take values on a discrete space containing N grid points { V ( 
But this implies that TD vD and U*(V)< U'ax(V), VVe-(D v 1
In Proposition 6, by allowing U to take continuous values leads to a large reduction in the amount of search over the grid points. At any (t + 1)th iteration, we only search for admissible expected utilities of agent 2 along a single dimensional space P , whereas in Lemma 5, we were searching over a two-dimensional space W, for admissible expected utility pairs. However, as is commonplace in dynamic programming problems where the mapping that defines the Bellman equation is not a contraction and uniqueness of a fixed point of this mapping is not guaranteed, Proposition 6 as an algorithm only works when a certain requirement is satisfied. Here the key requirement is that the function UOOax must in fact be a fixed point of operator T. Obviously, a sufficient condition for this is that the operator B preserves convexity, in the sense that for all t and V, (U1, V)e W, and ((U2, V)e iiW, together will imply (a Ui + (1 -a)U2, V)e W,, Va e(0, 1). In this case, B and B will essentially be equivalent. Finally, we note that although the condition that U'ax is a fixed point of Tmay be hard to verify analytically, it is straightforward to check computationally after the convergence occurs. (84) is not achievable. The value function U*( V(K)) is found to be concave and monotone decreasing. The efficient trading scheme is depicted in Figure 1 . Notice that U*(01, 02)(V(K))<ua*(0j, Oi)(V(K))< a*(02, 01)(V(K)), i= 1, 2. Remember that this is the property we prove analytically in Proposition 3, which describes the impact of current endowments on current trades. Also notice that a*(0j, Oj)(V(K)) are monotone increasing in K, which means that c*(0i, Oj)( V(K)), and hence o*(0j, 0X)( V(K)) + Oj, which is the current consumption of agent 2, tends to increase as K increases. That is, agent 2 will receive more transfer of the consumption good from agent I and hence consume more currently, as his wealth accumulates. Similarly, agent l's current consumption -a*(0,, Oj)( V(K)) + O decreases as K increases. Note that this is how history affects current consumption.
COMPUTING THE EFFICIENT CONTRACT: AN EXAMPLE
The optimal law of motion of the state variable is as follows: 
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper studies a model of dynamic insurance under private information in a pure exchange economy. There are two infinitely-lived agents in our model, both risk-averse and each having an i.i.d. stochastic endowment stream which is unobservable to the other. We give sufficient and necessary conditions for the existence of a constrained efficient contract. We show that a constrained efficient contract can be characterized in a Bellman equation. An algorithm for numerical computation of an efficient contract is discussed and an example with exponential utility is computed.
Our model here is simple and restricted. For example, there are only two agents in our model. One natural extension is to allow for multiple agents, and it is clear that the technical approach here is able to be modified to confront this situation. Specifically, in the case of N agents, an efficient contract can be defined as one which maximizes the Where the "e" is due to the fact that 0&(V(h0)) is a selection from T and the "c" is due to the fact that T is self-generating. Now for ii(hQ')eB(T) instead of V(h0t)eB(T), follow the above procedure to obtain a2(h2) and y(h/2). Repeat this for all t to obtain: ar(t Vh)) = {a (h'), U2(h ).
,(h'), . . 
S( V (h))= {v (h) V(h') . . . V(h'), . . .}.

We now demonstrate that S(VI((h)) is
